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TURKEY: A TEST CASE IN THE FUTURE OF ALLIANCES. (U)
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
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**TURKEY: A TEST CASE IN THE
FUTURE OF ALLIANCES**



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**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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**TURKEY: A TEST CASE IN THE FUTURE
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by

James E. Trinnaman

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FOREWORD

This memorandum considers the new strategic significance Turkey has assumed in the face of the shift of the Soviet drive to a degree from direct confrontation in Central Europe to exploitation of US and NATO weaknesses in the Eastern Mediterranean. The author views the 1975 US arms embargo of Turkey as having jeopardized US influence and military and intelligence assets in Turkey. He notes that for the first time since allying itself with NATO and the United States, Turkey has been forced to undertake a fundamental reappraisal of its alliances in the light of a most serious threat to its national security. The author concludes that the United States may have to assume broader security commitments to its Allies on the one hand, while accepting substantial constraints on its unilateral freedom of action on the other.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant

TURKEY: A TEST CASE IN THE FUTURE OF ALLIANCES

The 1974 Cyprus crisis and the chain of subsequent events have led to a new low in US-Turkish relations, created a most serious threat to the viability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) southeastern flank, and reduced US capability to pursue its interests in the Middle East. These events have occurred at a time when other developments in the region are making sound US-Turkish relations and continued firm commitment of Turkey to her NATO and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) alliances as imperative to US strategic interests as they ever were. This paper seeks to identify those recent regional trends which enhance Turkey's significance to the United States; to present a brief profile of Turkish politics, economics, and foreign policy; and to suggest measures which may be required to reestablish US-Turkish relations and to preserve the alliance structures.

Even the briefest visit to Turkey, or the most cursory review of the literature on the country, is enough to excite the imagination of any student of contemporary world affairs. In addition to its rich history and culture, modern Turkey possesses a unique attribute: of all the members of the North Atlantic Alliance, Turkey alone is part of, and is a crossroads between, three different worlds. It presents US policymakers in microcosm with almost the entire range of contemporary foreign policy problems in the non-Communist world.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MR JAMES E. TRINNAMAN joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1973. Mr. Trinnaman holds degrees in political science and economics from Hobart College and the John Hopkins University. For nine years he was a research scientist in the American University's Center for Research in Social Systems. He has also worked as a senior staff scientist for Operations Research, Inc., and more recently as an operations research analyst with the US Army Logistics Evaluation Agency. He has published articles on psychological operations and military affairs.

TURKEY: A TEST CASE IN THE FUTURE OF ALLIANCES

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Even the briefest visit to Turkey, or the most cursory review of the literature on the country, is enough to excite the imagination of any student of contemporary world affairs. In addition to its rich history and culture, modern Turkey possesses a unique attribute: of all the members of the North Atlantic Alliance, Turkey alone is part of, and is a crossroads between, three different worlds. It presents US policymakers in microcosm with almost the entire range of contemporary foreign policy problems in the non-Communist world.

• As a part of Western Europe, a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, and in preparation for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), Turkey shares in the current European malaise over economic problems brought on by the energy crisis, double-digit inflation, and perceived industrial and trade imbalances. Turkey has also experienced to some degree the general European drift to the political left, a popularly felt need to grasp for radical solutions to problems attributed to the failure of democratic and modern capitalist institutions. In foreign policy, Turkey shares in the dichotomy of Europe facing a Soviet Union popularly perceived as less of a threat because of current Kremlin policies on the one hand, and as more of a threat because of dramatically increased military capabilities on the other. Turkey has also felt itself more exposed as a result of US-Soviet detente, over which it has had little say or influence, and as a result of which it has felt obliged to pursue its own relaxation of tensions bilaterally with the Soviet Union.

• Turkey is also part of the Middle East, by way of shared religion, Islam, as well as by historical interest and attachment. As power and influence have shifted to the Arab oil states, Turkey has experienced a dramatic popular resurgence of interest in and identification with the Middle East. One minor political party in Turkey argues persuasively that the nation should sever its sterile ties with the West, return to the purity of Islam, and perhaps assume once again the classic role of protector of the Faithful against the infidel, Russian and European alike.

• Finally, Turkey is part of the developing world. Still a poor and largely agricultural country, it faces with the rest of the developing world all the growing pains of seemingly agonizingly slow modernization and industrial development. It shares in the experience of rapid population growth, dislocation, and concentration in ill-prepared urban areas. It also shares in the intense need for external development assistance and favorable terms of trade. In addition, Turkey is experimenting with its own brand of socialism in some areas of the economy in the search for social justice, for a solution to the problem that so few Turks have a share as yet in the benefits of development.

In all of these roles, Turkey is a challenge to the United States. It challenges US policymakers to redefine US interests in Turkey and in the region, and to persevere in the search for new accommodations to new trends developing in both Western Europe and the Middle East.

Turkey also stands as a test case for the developing world of the utility of close association with the United States and Western Europe, of the applicability of Western political and economic concepts to the problems of modernization and development. In short, the question is can the United States come out of the post-Vietnam doldrums, throw off the appearance of lacking a sense of appropriate direction and the will and ability to pursue that direction, and construct a new foundation upon which it can establish new leadership and impetus in world affairs.¹

NEW REGIONAL TRENDS

Soviet efforts to expand its presence and influence in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa. With the signing of the Helsinki agreements in August 1975, the Soviet Union achieved most of its interim objectives for Central Europe: recognition of the status quo of the Eastern European satellite states, the legitimacy of continued Soviet military presence in these states, and the reduction of a sense of direct Soviet threat to Western Europe. Having achieved stalemate on the European central front, and having further increased the Chinese sense of isolation by detente with the United States, the Soviet Union could begin in earnest to exploit opportunities presented by its growing presence and influence in the Mediterranean. In a few years the Soviet Navy has grown to approximately the size of the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. To this fleet the Soviets will soon add an air capability with two aircraft carriers, and land based capability in Syria and Libya. It is constructing a multibillion dollar naval complex in Libya to replace its Egyptian facilities, and is seeking or has already gained port accesses in Yugoslavia, Albania, Malta, Algeria, Morocco, and elsewhere. It continues to build up immense stocks of war materiel in Syria and Iraq. Soviet goals appear to be: gradual erosion and neutralization of effective US presence and influence in the Mediterranean by the creation of a superior naval force; continuing encirclement of the Middle East and its oil reserves by expanding port and missile facilities in the Mediterranean, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea; and as opportunity permits, exploitation of African weakness, isolation, and racial tension to gain further footholds on both east and west coasts of the continent. For the Soviet Union, the Eastern Mediterranean traditionally has been a potential avenue of enemy assault on the Soviet heartland. As the balance of power shifts to its favor in the region, the Soviets are finding it a ready avenue for their own expansion.

The rapid increase of political and economic influence of the Arab oil states. The successful manipulation of oil as an international political and economic weapon has caused a dramatic shift of power to the Arab states. The immense revenues now generated by the export of oil are supporting rapid economic and military growth in the area, and are providing leverage against the United States and the rest of the world for resolution of the conflict with Israel on Arab terms. At the same time, the Arab states are dependent on the maintenance of at least a balance of US-Soviet power in the Mediterranean and Middle East in order to enjoy the freedom to exercise this new power. Should the Soviet Union emerge as the preponderant power, it could exercise the oil weapon itself to weaken the Western Alliance, to divide and intimidate Western Europe.

New strategic importance of the Mediterranean. As a result of these developments, the Mediterranean is beginning to take on a new strategic importance to the United States and Western Europe on a magnitude not yet fully appreciated on either side of the Atlantic. Since the end of World War II and until recently, the United States enjoyed such a preponderance of power in the Mediterranean that the lack of challenge itself was enough to obscure the strategic importance of the region, not only as an adjunct to the NATO central front and as a convenient route through which to support US commitments to Israel, but in its own right. For a period during the 1960's and early 1970's, it was popular to deprecate US and NATO assets in the Mediterranean as of marginal and peripheral significance. It was believed that in an era of US-Soviet nuclear stalemate, and when strategic nuclear deterrence occupied center stage in assessments of total military capability, the Soviets would be deterred from anything but the most cautious probing around the periphery of US interests. Mediterranean assets hardly counted in the equation. A Library of Congress study published in early 1975 could still conclude that the loss of Greece and Turkey to NATO, while having psychological effect on the rest of NATO, would have no significant impact on the European central front.² The study failed altogether to foresee the effects of growing Soviet presence and influence in the region and the threat these pose to Western Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In fact, the Mediterranean is a key area in any US global strategy to maintain the integrity of its security alliances and prevent further Soviet expansion.

Deterioration of the NATO southern flank countries. Events in the past 2 years in all four NATO southern flank countries have caused

considerable deterioration of US and NATO capabilities in the Mediterranean. Affairs in these countries continue to be unsettled and suggest the strong possibility of further and more rapid deterioration. Portugal came close to an outright takeover by Communists and radical military officers sharing deep-seated hostilities toward the United States and Western Europe. This experience caused the United States to recognize the vital importance of the Azores as an outpost for the defense of North America and for the defense of the Atlantic and approaches to the Mediterranean. It also alerted the United States to the direct threat that the Soviets could pose with access to the naval and air facilities of a hostile mainland Portugal. Italy appears to suffer from increasing economic dislocations and political impotence, making progressively more attractive to the Italian electorate the appeals of the Communist Party. The 1975 elections gave the Communists one-third of the popular vote and participation in, if not outright control of, the municipal governments of most major cities. The United States and Western Europe may soon discover whether there is such a thing as a Communist party which can be hostile to Soviet expansionism, and whether an Alliance member with a coalition government including Communists could still participate effectively in NATO. The Cyprus crisis of 1974 caused the downfall of a Greek government with which the United States had some considerable influence. The failure of the Greek effort on Cyprus gave rise to intense popular anti-American sentiment, a considerable reduction of US presence, and finally, the withdrawal of Greek forces and assets from NATO. The crisis and the subsequent US arms embargo caused Turkey to assume control of all military installations in Turkey, to close US intelligence facilities, and to begin to question the wisdom of complete reliance on the United States for the maintenance of its national security.

Within the context of these regional developments, and despite the current disarray in US-Turkish relations, it is necessary to attempt to restate and project the importance of Turkey to the United States and to the rest of NATO as a basis for determining future goals and policies with respect to Turkey.

NATO AND US INTERESTS IN TURKEY

The United States and the rest of Western Europe must seek through NATO to reestablish and maintain an effective deterrent and defensive posture against the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat on the southeastern flank

by encouraging Turkey's continued commitment to the defense of that flank. In maintaining this posture, Turkey offers unique opportunity for forward basing of missile, air, and ground forces directly threatening Soviet industrial, transportation, and communication centers. Heretofore, NATO has never sought to exploit this opportunity fully. NATO should also seek to reopen the intelligence facilities in Turkey, which form an integral part of US and NATO early warning systems. Turkey also brings to the Alliance sizeable land and air forces. It can monitor and in wartime block Soviet access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits; and it can block Soviet land and air access to the Middle East. It is the only NATO member with unrestricted access to the Black Sea in peacetime. To maintain and enhance these capabilities, the United States in particular should seek to reestablish Turkish confidence in firm US resolve to support Turkey against threats to its national security.

NATO should also seek to maintain unrestricted access to and control of the Mediterranean as the principal communications link among NATO members on the southern flank and between Western European states and their energy sources in the Middle East. The United States specifically should seek to maintain an effective military presence in the Mediterranean, to include reestablishment of US presence in Turkey and maintenance of a superior naval force in the US Sixth Fleet. In addition, the United States should encourage other NATO members to assume greater responsibility for the maintenance of security in the Mediterranean.

Western Europe and the United States should promote continued progress of Turkey toward economic integration in the European Economic Community, and facilitate Turkey's economic development.

The United States and Western Europe have a strong interest in the search for some formula to promote peace and cooperation between Greece and Turkey, by settlement of the Cyprus issue and resolution of the growing dispute over access to the waters and air space of the Aegean.

Finally, the United States and Western Europe have an interest in encouraging Turkey's continued participation in CENTO. And in the broader regional context, they must encourage Turkey in its search for a new identification with, and new role to play among, the other nations of the Middle East.

With these interests and goals in mind, it is useful to sketch briefly the politics, foreign policy, and economics of Turkey to lend

perspective to opportunities open to the United States in mending its alliance structures.

PROFILE OF TURKEY

The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, the remnant heartland of the Ottoman Empire. The demise of the Empire was a slow and painful one, beginning well before the defeats of the Balkan Wars in the 1820's and culminating with the defeats in ill-conceived alliance with Germany in World War I. After that war, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk emerged to galvanize a new Turkish nationalism and overthrow the weak Caliphate which was dominated by Great Britain and France. Ataturk then defeated the separatist movements of the Armenians and Kurds in the east, and repulsed the British and French-supported Greek invasion to the west. Several years later Ataturk persuaded the Soviets to return territory occupied by them in the north, and Britain to return territory annexed to British-mandated Iraq in the south. These established the borders of modern Turkey. Ataturk was adamant thereafter that Turkey would expend no more blood and treasure in seeking to reestablish any part of the old empire. To the present time Turkey has pursued domestic and foreign policies according to the dicta of Ataturk: preserve the territorial integrity of Turkey; make Turkey a Western and European nation by modernization, industrialization, and secularization; and build strong (and hopefully peaceful) relations with the rest of Europe.

Turkey is a nation of great pride, not only in past achievements of empire, but also in its continuing significant role in the United Nations, in Europe, and in the Middle East. Despite a long history of warfare with, and domination and humiliation by, the various European powers, and continuing to suffer patiently the perennial favoritism of Western Europe toward Greece, Turkey has continued to abide by Ataturk's directives and has accepted these conditions as the price for recognition by and admission to Europe.

Politics. The government of Turkey is made up of a bicameral legislature which elects a President every 7 years and approves the Presidential appointment of a Prime Minister. The legislature, or Grand National Assembly, is composed of the Senate of the Republic (upper house of 150 members) and the National Assembly (lower house of 450 members). The 1960 constitution makes the lower house supreme in normal legislation: it initiates and has the final vote on legislative

proposals and final approval of the budget; it alone casts votes of confidence or of no confidence on the government's program. The President is Head of State, elected by the Grand National Assembly from among its members. His responsibilities are to promulgate laws and appoint the Prime Minister. He is expected to be above partisan politics and to act as a political arbitrator; to foster this role, the President is given a longer term in office and is not eligible for reelection. The real executive authority is vested in the Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister. After an election of the National Assembly, the President appoints the Prime Minister from the majority party, who in turn nominates the other ministers and prepares a legislative program. The Prime Minister must keep at least a bare majority of votes in the National Assembly for his government to survive. If the election produces no majority party, then each of the major parties seeks to form a coalition with one or more minor parties to gain the necessary majority vote. When a Prime Minister loses his majority by a vote of no confidence, his government resigns and the President selects another political leader to form a new government.³

The major political parties are: the Republican People's Party (RPP) (left of center, headed by Bulent Ecevit), and the Justice Party (JP) (right of center, headed by Suleyman Demirel). Smaller parties include the National Salvation Party (advocating a return to Islam and rejuvenation of traditional religious and social precepts); the New Democratic Party; and the Republican Reliance Party. The Communist Party is proscribed.

The RPP was founded by Ataturk in 1923 as the sole political party of the new republic. After Ataturk's death in 1938, his long time political and military lieutenant, Ismet Inonu, headed the party. In 1945, Inonu believed the time was ripe to allow the establishment of opposition parties. RPP rule came to an end in the 1950 elections when the breakaway Democratic Party led by Adnan Menderes won a majority. The Democratic Party began as a liberal party but was finally overthrown by the army in 1960 because of its increasingly autocratic posture and because of rising public dissidence. The RPP was revitalized and succeeded in forming several governments in the 1960's.

In 1973, under the leadership of Ecevit, the RPP gained a plurality and formed a coalition government with the National Salvation Party. Ecevit's strong stand during the 1974 Cyprus crisis made him a national hero. Seeking to capitalize on this popularity, Ecevit resigned in September 1974, anticipating new elections which would give his party

a clear majority. Instead, fear of Ecevit's popularity drove the opposition into forming a new government with the Justice Party's Demirel as Prime Minister, supported by four minor conservative parties. The Justice Party had emerged in 1961 as the inheritor of the organization of the proscribed Democratic Party under the leadership of retired General Gumuspala. Demirel took the leadership of the party in 1964, and succeeded in winning the election of 1965. The failure of this government to take adequate steps against growing terrorism by extremist elements, especially among students and labor movements, led the army to intervene again in 1971 to dissolve this first Demirel government.

Turkish politics are characterized by three particular attributes. First, although the political process operates in elections and in the formation and dissolution of governments, it is allowed to do so only within certain limits. From the time of Ataturk, the army has always retained the residual power to intervene if the government becomes either ineffective or autocratic, and it has done so on several occasions. Although the army has shown itself reluctant to intervene, and after each such occasion has gone to lengths to reestablish the political process, Turkish governments must not only maintain a legislative majority but also the acquiescence of the military in order to survive. In addition, with the passing of Inonu, the last of the great political or military leaders of the revolution has departed the political arena. No current political leader has equivalent military credentials; from now on the Turkish military may be less constrained in its entry into and settlement of political squabbles. Second, the 1960 Constitution set up a system of proportional representation designed to discourage the emergence of a single dominant party. This was done in the belief that governments with narrow majorities or coalition governments would be less able to establish autocratic rule. In practice this has led to a succession of weak governments, and at times the inability to form any government at all. Third, there are possibly sizable groups with sentiments on both extreme right and left which are not represented in either the party or government structures as constituted. Several fringe parties, including the Communists, have been declared illegal. All three of these attributes create a political system prone to disruption, and frequently unable to pursue coherent domestic, economic, or foreign policies.⁴

Foreign Relations. Turkey is a member of the United Nations, NATO, and CENTO. Until recently, Turkey's foreign relations were

focused almost exclusively on the United States and Western Europe: through extensive bilateral agreements with the United States on economic and military assistance and on the maintenance of US intelligence/surveillance installations on Turkish soil; through its substantial contribution to Western Europe's defense in the NATO alliance; and through its economic program aimed at eventual membership in the European Economic Community. Since the mid-1960's, however, Turkey has also sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union, the Communist Balkan countries, and the Arab states.

The primary and traditional threat to Turkey is the Soviet Union. From the days of Czarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Russia has sought control of the Turkish Straits and, to a lesser degree, land access to the Middle East through eastern Turkey. During the latter days of the Empire, the Turks became increasingly dependent on British and French naval power and German armies to counter Russian expansionism. And the price was always high: the defeat in disastrous alliance with Germany during World War I, followed by a period of inordinate British and French influence on the Caliphate accompanied by extremes of economic exploitation. More recently, in the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreements dividing Poland and setting the stage for World War II, Germany blessed Soviet plans to assume control of the Straits and to establish naval facilities at such time as the rest of Europe became occupied with the war. In a final attempt, immediately after the war the Soviets sought Allied approval of a plan for "joint" Soviet-Turkish control of the Straits and demanded that Turkey cede the districts of Kars and Ardahan in the east. Since then, Turkey's membership in NATO and strong association with the United States have silenced Soviet territorial demands on Turkey.

Of much lesser military magnitude, but both persistent and heavily emotion-laden, is the threat posed by Greece. Even in the best of times relations have been cold between the two countries. The Greeks remember with hatred the almost 400 years of Ottoman rule, especially the bloody Turkish attempts at repression in the last years. The Turks remember the equally bloody reprisals of the Greeks during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, and the Greek efforts after World War I (with British and French encouragement) to reestablish Byzantium by invasion of western Turkey. Greek-Turkish animosities continue to be played out in three bitterly contested arenas: Cyprus; the islands, waters, and air space of the Aegean; and Thrace.

Since achieving independence in 1960, Cyprus has been the cause of near war between Greece and Turkey on three occasions. The island has been a prize of war throughout recorded history. It was part of the Byzantine Empire to 1191, but the connection was a tenuous one from the 7th Century onward due to repeated Arab invasions. Great Britain acquired the island in 1191 only to lose it to the Italian states shortly thereafter. The Italian states traded the island among themselves until the Turkish conquest in 1571. The British forced an ailing Ottoman Empire to lease the island to them in 1878, and then annexed it in 1914 with the onset of World War I. During this war the British offered Cyprus to Greece in exchange for support to the Allied effort; Greece declined the invitation. However, by 1931 rising nationalist sentiment on both the mainland and the island began to express itself in growing agitation for *enosis*, union with mainland Greece. The British finally granted independence to Cyprus in 1960, with Britain, Greece, and Turkey assuming responsibility as guarantors of Cypriot independence.

Greece has always claimed Cyprus, based on the early historical ties and the fact that the Cypriot population is almost 80 percent Greek. In 1964, 1967, and 1974, Greek Cypriot elements, led and supplied by mainland Greece, attempted to take control of the island and unite it with the mainland. It was only on the last attempt that Turkey felt obliged to send military forces to the island despite the risks of US and Western European displeasure. The initial rationale for the Turkish invasion was to provide protection for the Turkish minority, but early military successes and the seeming lack of unambiguous signals from the United States and Western Europe to desist encouraged Turkey to press on toward a military solution to the problem once and for all. Turkey now occupies about 40 percent of the island and is demanding acceptance of and security guarantees for an autonomous Turkish territory as a precondition for military withdrawal.

Turkey has always believed itself the aggrieved party in the Cyprus conflict, twice deterred from intervention by US threats of retaliation and US assurances of somehow solving the problems of continued Greek agitation for union and suppression of the Turkish minority. Turkey also believes it has acted responsibly and legitimately in the 1974 crisis. Two days after Greek elements overthrew President Makarios on July 15, Turkey approached Great Britain as co-guarantor of Cypriot independence to discuss appropriate countermeasures. Britain declined to become involved. Poorly reported in the US press was the fact that Turkey also seems to have conferred with US

representatives at this time, declaring its intention to intervene militarily on Cyprus to meet its guarantor responsibility. Laurance Stern asserts that US Undersecretary for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco met with Premier Ecevit who informed him of the intended actions prior to the intervention.⁵ There seemed to be no question raised at the time of Turkey's using NATO-designated war reserve materials; for years Turkey has been almost totally dependent on the United States as the supplier of military equipment and supplies.

Greece and Greek supporters in the United States subsequently made much of Turkish use of NATO-designated military equipment in pressing the US government to establish and maintain the arms embargo of Turkey. (The embargo was initiated in February 1975 and reaffirmed by Congress in July; it was not until after this reaffirmation that Turkey moved to take command of or close US bases and installations.) It was with great embarrassment that Greece, in August, 1975, admitted publicly that it too had appropriated NATO-designated stocks of war reserve materials during the crisis.⁶


The continuing friction in US-Turkish relations stems in part from the failure of the United States to recognize the potential conflict inherent in the US legal limitation on the use of US-supplied arms for defensive purposes, while at the same time encouraging an ally such as Turkey to undertake other responsibilities under international agreement which may subsequently require that country to intervene militarily in a situation not directly related to either its or NATO's defense.

The Aegean Sea has also become a source for Greek-Turkish tensions. Turkey can argue persuasively that the division of the Aegean unfairly favors the Greeks, due principally to persistent British favoritism in the waning years of its influence in the eastern Mediterranean. Historically, Byzantine control of the Aegean islands (the Dodecanese, Rhodes, Khios, and Lesvos, for example) ended in 1204. The Turks established control gradually from 1415 through 1522, with the various Italian states being the losers for the most part. Italy seized the islands again in 1911-12, and the legitimacy of Italian possession was acknowledged by the other European powers. After defeat in World War II, Italy ceded the islands, not to Turkey, but to Greece. Further complicating the issue is the growing importance of naval and air access in the Aegean; the Greeks insist that they exercise full sovereign control over all the Aegean, and over the air and surface space and subsurface wealth of the Sea.⁷

Thrace is the one land area in which Greece and Turkey share a common frontier, with the bulk of the land forces of both countries committed to the defense of their respective parts. Should Greek-Turkish relations become further inflamed, it is here that either side would have most ready access to the other. Should open conflict erupt, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries are well positioned to intervene to their best advantage, both from the common border with Bulgaria and through the Black Sea.

Turkish relations with the United States and its other NATO Allies have, for the most part, been very strong, due principally to the firm belief among Turkish military and political leaders that no other association could provide for the national security. The US arms embargo struck at the very heart of this conviction, and may have already cast Turkey along an unretracable path toward a new set of defense strategies. Even if US-Turkish relations are normalized, the United States will probably never again enjoy the freedom of action and influence it once had. The tragedy of the current situation is that the aftermath of the 1967 Cyprus crisis gave such a clear warning of the dangers to US and NATO interests in Turkey if Greek and Turkish passions were allowed to be rekindled over the island. At that time the RPP commissioned a special panel to review Turkey's alliance with the United States and NATO. The panel identified the following disadvantages to Turkey: the presence of US nuclear and NATO bases make Turkey a target for possible Soviet nuclear attack; the possibility exists that Turkey may be dragged into a war of no concern to it; there is doubt that NATO would operate to defend Turkey in the event of attack; Turkey's freedom of action is curtailed because of commitment of forces to NATO and because of US control over the use of military equipment provided under aid agreements; and there is exacerbation of relations with the Soviet Union and the Arab states because of participation in NATO. The panel recommended abrogation of agreements permitting the presence of a US electronic intelligence network, repeal of all special concessions to US forces in Turkey, elimination of strike bases, denuclearization of Turkey, and development of an independent national military force besides those committed to NATO. The panel's recommendations were not adopted at that time, but they were a clear precursor of Turkish attitudes and actions when Cyprus erupted again, and may yet form the crux of Turkish demands on the United States for normalization of relations.⁸

Military. The Turkish armed forces number about 450,000. The



US Bases and Facilities in Turkey⁹

(The map above was published August 11, 1975, by *Newsweek*, purporting to show the US and NATO military assets in Turkey which were closed or brought under Turkish control at that time. Although it may be imprecise as to both location and identification of assets, the map suggests the magnitude of the problem as the popular press was reporting it to the American public during the embargo crisis.)

army has about 365,000 men and is formed into 1 armored, 2 mechanized infantry, and 12 infantry divisions, and 3 armored, 3 mechanized infantry, 5 infantry, and 1 parachute brigades. The army is committed entirely to NATO, and constitutes about one-third of the total ground forces committed to NATO. The navy has 40,000 men. It operates 16 submarines, 13 destroyers, 5 escort vessels, 70 patrol boats, 20 minesweepers, 9 minelayers and about 50 landing craft. It is not committed to NATO command. The air force has 48,000 men and about 300 combat aircraft. Most air force equipment is of US design and manufacture. It is committed to NATO and is one of the largest, most well-trained air forces in the eastern Mediterranean.

Turkish military expenditures have remained steady in recent years at about 4.5 percent of Gross National Product (GNP). The Turkish economy is unable to support the military budget and must receive outside assistance. Until the arms embargo this assistance came from the United States. Total US military assistance until 1975 totalled over \$6 billion. Recent totals of US aid and credits were between \$150 and 200 million annually.¹⁰

Economics. Turkey embarked on its Third Five Year Plan in 1973. The Plan seeks to continue the pace of industrial development, broaden the agricultural base to eliminate the need to import food products, and strengthen management and financial institutions. Turkey is still a relatively poor, developing country, with a population of about 40 million and a GNP per capita of about \$400.

The long-range economic development plan is focused on the year 1995, when Turkey is scheduled to become a full member of the EEC. By that time Turkish industry must be strong enough to survive the mandatory reductions in protection by tariff, have sufficient skilled labor to be competitive with other European labor forces in terms of productivity per unit of cost, and have expanded agriculture to meet anticipated increases in domestic consumption requirements without dependence on sizeable imports. As an indication of how far Turkey has to go, the development plan calls for achievement of a per capita GNP of \$1,500 by 1995, a level equivalent to that of Italy today.

Although the growth of the Turkish economy has been erratic, by 1974 Turkey appeared to enjoy several advantages and be capable of sustaining progress toward its stated economic goals. With foreign reserves of almost \$2 billion and foreign aid from all sources of about \$400 million annually, the government was prepared to be somewhat aggressive in borrowing and investment in basic means of production to

maintain the pace toward modernization. Remittances from the Turkish labor force employed in Western Europe also continued relatively strong despite the adoption of a freeze on any further labor importation by most Western European countries. Foreign labor remittances continue to be something over \$500 million annually.

On the negative side of the balance sheet is a growing inflation over which Turkey has been unable to exercise effective control. By 1974, the annual rate of inflation had risen to 15 percent and continued to increase throughout 1975. In addition, the energy crisis and the dramatic increase in the price of oil are major threats to both Turkey's exchange reserves and development plans.

Turkey continues to experience difficulty in achieving a more equitable distribution of the benefits of economic development, both among the various economic sectors and the geographic regions. There is heavy emphasis in the current development plan on greater social justice, with substantially increased minimum wages and agricultural support prices, both of which can feed further inflation. Also, the current plan calls for a substantial increase in private savings for investment in the growth sectors of the economy. These efforts could be severely affected by continued inflation, or by political and regional unrest aggravated by poor income distribution.¹¹

The bulk of Turkish industry is concentrated around Istanbul and Izmir; the principal industrial products are textiles and chemicals. Turkey hopes to continue exporting cotton as a source of foreign exchange, while at the same time eliminating the once sizable dependence on importation of clothes and finished textiles. To do this, development plans have focused on the textile industry, including the introduction of synthetic fibers production allied to the growing domestic petro-chemicals industry. The high import cost of machinery for the textile industry, however, makes growth in this sector a costly initial drain on available foreign exchange resources.

Other domestic industries include iron and steel, cement, and automobile assembly (Fiat, Renault, Ford, and British Leyland). In these categories Turkey is close to satisfying the growing domestic market.

There is a strong political desire in Turkey to achieve greater self-sufficiency in overall domestic production. The government has sought progress toward this goal through public ownership and operation of the basic means of production—especially transportation, coal, and chemicals (the State Economic Enterprises being both the

central management and investment vehicle)—and through high tariff and administrative barriers to foreign industrial competition. The private sector is generally regarded as lacking the financial capacity and administrative talent to operate the large industrial concerns required. Foreign private capital investment was never strongly encouraged until recently, and now only in limited areas. If Turkish industrial and financial institutions remain highly dependent on protectionism and relatively inefficient production, the goal of entry into the EEC in 1995 could be jeopardized. Similarly, a reduction of domestic demand would have a calamitous effect on a domestic industry which is relatively inflexible, publicly-owned and subsidized, expensive, and noncompetitive.¹²

As of 1973, 65 percent of the population was still engaged in agriculture. The bulk of agricultural production takes place on small farms operating close to the subsistence level. At the same time, 75 percent of foreign exchange earnings (about \$200 million) comes from agricultural products—principally cotton, tobacco, and hazelnuts.

Turkey is largely able to feed itself, although production remains vulnerable to erratic weather conditions. Also, broad reaches of Turkey are relatively infertile. As with most developing countries, Turkey is facing the dilemma of reducing inequalities in land ownership while aggregating land holdings to facilitate the introduction of modern technology—new seeds, fertilization, irrigation, and erosion control. At the same time, and while still maintaining an agricultural growth rate of almost 5 percent, Turkey must encourage gradual labor movement from the land into the industrial sector where planned growth is closer to 12 percent.

A continuing problem in US-Turkish relations is the production of opium. In 1971, Turkey acceded in part to US pressure to curb opium production. In that year, 149 tons was recorded as the "official" harvest, mostly state-owned and sold by the government to Western pharmaceutical industries. In 1974, these agreements broke down as a result of the Cyprus crisis. For Turkey, opium remains a sizable foreign exchange earner, both through "official" and "illegal" markets. In 1973, ten kilos of raw opium could be bought in the village for \$600. When refined into a kilo of pure heroin, the street price in New York would be \$580,00. The immense financial returns bring a sizable number of poor Turkish farmers and traders into alliance with a highly-sophisticated international criminal organization in a combination seemingly beyond any effective control.¹³

The desire for continued, stable, economic development is one of the most forceful incentives in Turkey today. Domestic policies are geared to maintaining a relatively tranquil political environment by promoting a sense of continuing political and economic improvements. In foreign economic policy Turkey recognizes a continuing need for large foreign credits and assistance, and favorable trade terms from its Western Allies. Within limits, Turkey has also been willing to accept economic assistance from the Soviet Union, including several processing plants around Izmir, and more recently by signing a longer-term pact for \$600 million in aid. The demands of national security and the NATO commitment entail heavy expenditures on military forces and hardware, and these also require considerable Allied assistance.

The greatest present threat to both domestic tranquility and economic development is the Cyprus issue and continued tension with Greece. Popular emotions over the Turkish minority on Cyprus are such that no government could survive an apparent capitulation on the issue. On the other hand, successful resolution of the issue would relieve Turkey of much popular pressure and the painfully high costs of continued heavy military presence on the island (estimated at \$1.8 billion for 1974-75). The political liability of appearing to weaken because of either economic cost or foreign pressure is such that any Turkish government must continue to risk the growing consequences of the economic dislocations involved. In addition, the recent discovery of oil in the Aegean has heightened the continuing friction with Greece over rights of access to this area. It may become a source of further tension as the location and magnitude of the find are clarified. The economic development plans of both countries would be greatly facilitated by possession of an abundant energy reserve.

TURKEY AND FUTURE OF ALLIANCES

Turkey is a vital link in the defense of an increasingly strategically significant Mediterranean in the face of growing Soviet presence and activity which threaten both Western Europe and the Middle East. Search for successful resolution of current US-Turkish tensions is a test of US ability to adapt to new conditions and, in the larger context, preserve vital alliance structures.

The first and most critical problem for the United States is a requirement for a more perceptive, responsive, and innovative US foreign policy. There is increasing, openly-expressed concern among the

Allies and friends of the United States over the lack of US vitality and leadership in world affairs. As trite as it seems to say, the traumas of Vietnam, Watergate, and domestic economic dislocations of the early 1970's must not endure much longer. Congress has a responsibility to provide overall goals for US foreign policy, and to advise the President from its collective sense of the public will. It is the Executive function to devise detailed policy and direct the conduct of foreign affairs. The US Congress' arms embargo of Turkey is a case in point: the act was one of attempting to conduct foreign affairs, by bludgeoning an ally with threats to its very survival—ill-timed, misdirected, emotional, and sterile in terms of achieving the desired effect. It also placed US vital interests in jeopardy, and increased the threat to the national security of Greece, the supposed beneficiary of the act. Congress has its legitimate and necessary role to play, but there is wisdom in the Constitutional separation of powers; the day-to-day fine tuning of foreign relations is the responsibility of the President.

It is my opinion that, once having established direction, new and strenuous efforts to coordinate and orchestrate policy with Alliance partners are required, including unequivocal and concerted signals to the Soviet Union as to the acceptable limits of their foreign ventures. Detente will probably return again to its original, more limited dimension: joint efforts to reduce the threat of miscalculation and accidental nuclear exchange.

Within this new context, normalization of US-Turkish relations and establishment of a climate of cooperation and partnership should be pursued vigorously. In this effort the United States enjoys two great advantages: there remains in Turkey an immense popular reservoir of distrust and hatred for the Soviet Union; and neither major Turkish political party is hostile to the United States or Western Europe. The greatest area of opportunity will be in a coordinated US-Western European effort to facilitate Turkish economic development and early integration into the EEC. At the same time, both the United States and Western Europe can reassure Turkey by providing assistance in a new program of military modernization.

I would conclude that several substantive changes are likely to be imposed by Turkey or NATO as a precondition for normalization of relations. In the long run these can add significantly to the vitality of the Alliance and the sense of Turkish participation and commitment. These may include Turkish command and control of all bases and facilities in Turkey; the establishment of a new NATO command for

Turkey alone, or the establishment of sizable Turkish ground and air forces not directly committed to or under the immediate command of NATO. The United States will probably have to accept new limitations and constraints on its own military forces and intelligence installations; in case of the latter, the United States may have to accommodate to new systems under which Turkish elements operate all facilities and provide appropriate inputs through NATO channels. Any of these preconditions will require the United States to support programs to construct greatly improved command and communications systems among NATO southern flank countries, and a greatly improved theater logistics system.

Resolution of Greek-Turkish tensions would be too ambitious a near-term goal for anyone, but efforts to control and dampen them are feasible and necessary. The Cyprus problem can be reduced by acceptance of the Turkish proposal for an autonomous territory for the Turkish minority, probably more like 25 percent of the island, accompanied by a graduated Turkish military withdrawal and a general demilitarization. NATO members must convey to Greece in the firmest possible terms that the independence of Cyprus must be respected and *enosis* quietly abandoned. The United States should encourage Great Britain to reverse its decision to abandon its base in 1977 and maintain its guarantor role; a US offer to defray at least a portion of the cost may be enough to retain the base in its useful supplementary role in regional NATO defense.

I would also think that, in the Aegean, Greece must be encouraged to recognize and facilitate the Turkish right of air and surface transit. Division of rights of undersea exploration and exploitation might be made along a line through the Aegean equidistant from the mainlands of the two countries. Greece must also be encouraged to demilitarize the Aegean islands immediately off the Turkish coast; fortifying these islands contravened earlier international accords and continues to be seen by Turkey as a severe provocation. Finally, Western Europe should discourage Greece from its current position of viewing membership in the EEC as a substitute for participation in NATO. Greece must decide in its own national interest whether the leverage on the United States, Western Europe, and Turkey as well, together with security against Soviet threat, that continued membership in NATO gives Greece is sufficient to justify that membership. If not, Greece should be allowed to withdraw. The option which should be denied Greece as the poorest of all possible precedents is that of continued participation in NATO

councils while contributing no men, materiel, or facilities to the Alliance. As bitter as these pills may be to Greece, they may be sweetened in part by NATO guarantees of Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands and by providing much needed economic development assistance.

Therefore, I believe in the broader context of the US security alliance system, the United States will likely face challenges and need for accommodation to change paralleling closely those suggested by our current experiences with Turkey. The rest of Western Europe must be encouraged to greater participation and assumption of responsibility in NATO, which may require in turn that United States divest itself of supreme command authority and accept additional constraints on its unilateral freedom of action. A viable alliance structure in Western Europe may in fact require progressive integration of the military and security systems with the developing European economic and political institutions, in which the United States would be cast in the role of an outsider—an interested party, a co-member of equal standing in new political, economic, and military associations across the Atlantic, but an outsider.

ENDNOTES

1. Ideas and materials for this paper were drawn largely from discussions with US military and diplomatic personnel in Turkey, Greece, and Italy which took place in July 1975. The author also gratefully acknowledges the contribution of ideas by COL Robert M. Reuter, MAJ Howard L. Chambers, Mr. William B. Hanke, and Mr. William V. Kennedy, Institute members who have undertaken related studies. This paper's interpretations and conclusions, however, are the responsibility of the author alone.

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Interests as they ever were. This paper seeks to identify those recent regional trends which enhance Turkey's significance to the United States; to present a brief profile of Turkish politics, economics, and foreign policy; and to suggest measures which may be required to reestablish US-Turkish relations and to preserve the alliance structures.

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